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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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21 JANUARY 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR--Kazakhstan party boss loses post and probably also ousted from USSR party presidium; Khrushchev may be shaking up top party staff.

①

Yugoslav-Cuban communiqué is latest step by both in efforts to promote neutralism; Tito may visit other Latin American countries as well as Cuba.

②

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Burmese Premier Ne Win going to Peiping to discuss border issue; Chinese concessions now would help Peiping in Sino-Indian situation.

③

South Korea--Syngman Rhee's leading opponent for presidency may withdraw from spring elections for medical reasons.


④

Jordan incensed over what it sees as UAR challenge to Amman's sovereignty over West Jordan.

⑤

Belgian Congo--State of emergency proclaimed over tribal warfare in interior.

⑥




III. THE WEST

⑦ Italy--Premier Segni suffers mild stroke; aftermath may be formation of a cabinet less dependent on the right.

LATE ITEM

⑧ GMAIC comments on 20 January launching of vehicle from Tyura Tam to Pacific impact area.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 January 1960

DAILY BRIEF

SIRAB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK

USSR: Nikolay Belyayev, removed as party boss of Soviet Kazakhstan ostensibly for mismanagement in agriculture, may also have lost his membership in the top-ranking all-union party presidium. Belyayev's demotion is in line with several recent indications that Khrushchev, dissatisfied with some of his lieutenants, has been shaking up his staff. He now may find it expedient to bring some new faces into its ranks. [redacted]

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Yugoslavia-Cuba: The joint Yugoslav-Cuban communiqué, signed in Belgrade on 19 January, calling for greatly expanded mutual relations is an important step in the policies of both countries to expand their influence and encourage "neutrality" in underdeveloped countries. Tito agreed to visit Cuba "as soon as possible" and might well visit other western hemisphere countries during the trip. Last October, [redacted]

[redacted] Castro first expressed the desire for a conference of the leaders of "positive neutrality"--Nasir, Tito, Nehru, and Sukarno. On 13 January, Nasir also agreed in principle to an invitation from Cuban Foreign Minister Roa to visit Havana. [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO

Burma - Communist China: Premier Ne Win has accepted an invitation to go to Peiping for talks on the long-standing border issue and proposes to go on 23 January. While he has long refused to undertake such talks because there was no sign his terms would be met, he apparently now feels that he has received sufficient indications that an agreement could be reached to justify the effort. Any concessions by Peiping to Burma would be calculated to give the Chinese Communists greater dividends in the Sino-Indian border issue. [redacted]

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South Korea: [Syngman Rhee's opponent in presidential elections this spring, Cho Pyong-ok of the opposition Democratic party, has decided not to campaign. Medical examinations by American doctors have revealed that Cho has a serious tumor, and may not live longer than five months. The Democratic vice-presidential candidate, incumbent Chang Myon, could become the party presidential candidate if Cho withdraws. However, he may remain in second place in the belief that he would win again against Assembly Speaker Yi Ki-pung and thus have a better chance for ultimately succeeding to the presidency.]

NO

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Watch Committee Conclusions: [The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future.]

NO

[Within and without Iraq, political groups continue to maneuver for power, and an attempt to assassinate Qasim could occur at any time.]

Jordan-UAR: Jordan's relations with the UAR are again strained, chiefly because of Jordanian sensitivity regarding West Jordan, formerly part of Palestine. The UAR recently sent a request for permission to send to Jerusalem a consul general whose area of jurisdiction the document described as including territory "occupied by the Jordanian Army." Jordanian officials are incensed, regarding this as evidence that the UAR has decided to challenge Jordanian sovereignty over West Jordan. [King Husayn feels the time has come to "clear the air and rebut conclusively" public assertions--including those by Iraqi Premier Qasim--that an independent state of Palestine should be established.] Jordan announced on 19 January that new proposals for settling the Palestine problem would be presented at the forthcoming meeting of Arab League foreign ministers.

NO

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Belgian Congo: Intermittent tribal warfare in the Congo interior has led to the proclamation of a state of emergency in the Luluabourg area, where over 110 Africans have been killed in the past three months. Belgian authorities have refused to recognize an agreement between two warring tribes, under which one of the two agreed to evacuate some 100,000 persons from disputed land. Although local security forces are attempting to disarm the opposing tribesmen prior to any new outbreaks, the intervention of Belgian authorities in the dispute may have compromised their status as mediators. During the current round-table talks with Congolese nationalists in Brussels, Belgian spokesmen may cite such violence as demonstrating a need for Belgian security forces even after a grant of autonomy.

OK

III. THE WEST

Italy: Premier Segni is said to have suffered a mild stroke on 16 January from which he is recovering. Although the incident has been kept secret, Segni may now be less reluctant to consider the early government reshuffle sought by his own party's left wing, and Christian Democratic party secretary Moro may press for formation of a cabinet less dependent on the right before the spring administrative elections.

NO

LATE ITEM

USSR: For comments by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee on the 20 January launching of a vehicle from Tyura Tam to the Pacific impact area designated by the USSR on 7 January, see page 6. (Map)

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev Realigns Top Command

The firing of party presidium member Nikolay Belyayev on 19 January as party chief in Kazakhstan is the latest of recent signs of a significant reshuffling of Khrushchev's top command. The circle of top leaders around Khrushchev now is smaller than at any time since he consolidated his power. In view of the complex tasks facing the Soviet leadership, Khrushchev may soon find it expedient to bring some new faces into the ranks of his top advisers.

At the party central committee meeting in December, Khrushchev charged Belyayev with poor leadership in organizing the harvest in Kazakhstan and accused him of "lacking the courage" to admit his errors. Factional infighting might also have been involved. Nikolay Rodionov, former party chief in Leningrad and a protégé of presidium member Premier Frol Kozlov, was named second secretary in the Kazakh party shuffle, suggesting that Kozlov had a hand in Belyayev's downfall. Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Kazakh premier, replaced Belyayev as first secretary. The Soviet announcement made no mention of a new post for Belyayev, probably indicating that he is not to be given an important job.

Belyayev's ouster follows the demotion last week of presidium member Aleksey Kirichenko, who had been second-in-command in the professional party machine, to party chief in Rostov Oblast. While events of the past few weeks have not reflected adversely on other members of the presidium, Nikolay Shvernik, 72, who is frequently sick, and Otto Kuusinen, 78, have apparently had little real influence for quite some time. Candidate member Yan Kalnberzin's transfer in November 1959 from Latvian party chief to the ceremonial post of chairman of the presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet signaled his loss of status.

The recent demotions of Belyayev and Kirichenko obviously affect the balance of forces on the presidium, and a new period of maneuvering among Khrushchev's lieutenants is likely.

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Tito to Visit Cuba

The joint Yugoslav-Cuban communiqué, signed in Belgrade on 19 January, calling for greatly expanded mutual relations is an important step in the policies of both countries to expand their influence and encourage "neutralism" in underdeveloped countries. Specifically, Belgrade and Havana decided to conclude cultural, and technical cooperation agreements with each other.

Since early last summer, Yugoslavia has sent several high-level delegations to Latin America in an effort to expand its economic and political influence in the area. Belgrade's current foreign policy calls for greater activity by "neutralists" in order to prevent any diminution of their influence in international affairs in the face of improved East-West relations. Tito himself has accepted an invitation to visit Cuba and will probably also visit other Latin American countries. In addition he probably hopes that this trip will encourage an invitation to visit the United States--which he has sought since 1945. [redacted]

[redacted] Cuban Premier Fidel Castro expressed a desire last October for a conference with Tito, Nasir, Nehru, and Sukarno--whom he termed leaders of "positive neutrality." [redacted] President Nasir on 13 January accepted in principle Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's invitation to visit Havana. A similar invitation is probably being extended to Sukarno by a Cuban diplomat now on an Asian mission to arouse interest in a proposed congress of underdeveloped nations in Havana next summer. Tito's and Nasir's cordiality may encourage attendance at the politically inspired conference, to which African, Asian, Arab, and Latin American countries as well as Yugoslavia and Greece are being invited. [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Premier Ne Win Accepts Peiping Invitation for Border Talks

Burmese Premier Ne Win, reversing his long-standing position, has decided to accept Premier Chou En-lai's repeated invitation to visit Peiping to discuss the Sino-Burmese border even though the Chinese have not accepted Burma's "final offer" of 4 June. He has informed Chou that he could arrive on 23 January for three days. This, he hoped, would provide sufficient time to "eliminate the relatively small difference" between the Burmese and Chinese positions. At the same time, he underlined the Burmese position by reminding Chou that the 4 June proposals were themselves a concession on Burma's part.

There has been no indication in recent diplomatic exchanges that either side intends to modify its position. Burmese insistence on specifics has been met by Chinese evasion and generalities. It is probable, however, that the reporting of the Burmese ambassador in Peiping on the recent marked cordiality of top Chinese Communist officials has encouraged the Burmese to believe that their terms may be met. They may also feel that the Communists will yield on the Burma border issue to counter the unfavorable world view of China arising from its role in the Sino-Indian dispute.

The Chinese apparently hope that a joint communiqué or other show of limited progress toward a border settlement would be acceptable to Ne Win. [redacted]

[redacted] they expected discussions with Ne Win to cover only "matters of principles." Any concessions by Peiping to Burma would be calculated to give the Chinese Communists greater dividends in the Sino-Indian border issue.

Ne Win, since taking office, has sought a border settlement to crown the accomplishments of his regime. He plans, following the elections on 6 February, to step down from the premiership, although he will continue in his regular post as commander in chief of the military forces. Should Peiping turn him down now, it will sharpen his anti-Communist bias. [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~Opposition Candidate May Withdraw From South Korean Presidential Election [redacted]


[Syngman Rhee's opponent in South Korea's presidential election this spring, Cho Pyong-ok of the Democratic party, may be forced to withdraw from the race for reasons of health. American army doctors have discovered that Chou has a tumor and warn that he may die within five months. Since there is no other opposition leader of Cho's political stature, his withdrawal would facilitate Rhee's re-election and enable the administration to make less use of repressive and illegal election tactics.]

[The Democratic vice-presidential candidate, incumbent Chang Myon, may become his party's presidential nominee if Cho withdraws. However, he may remain in second place in the belief that he would win again against National Assembly Speaker Yi Ki-pung and that this would give him the best chance for ultimately succeeding 84-year-old President Rhee. The death of the popular Democratic presidential candidate on the eve of the 1956 election generated wide popular sympathy for the party and contributed to Chang's election as vice president that year.]

[If Chang remains a candidate for the vice presidency, the administration may increase its pressures for a constitutional amendment stipulating that the president and vice president must belong to the same party. Such an amendment, if passed prior to the election, would assure the election of Rhee's relatively unpopular running mate.]


[While Cho's death probably would resolve the factional struggle for control of the Democratic party in favor of Chang Myon, it is questionable whether such an event would strengthen the opposition. Chang appears to have considerably less popular support than Cho and lacks his political courage. Many of Cho's followers might withdraw from the party rather than accept Chang's leadership.] [redacted]

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LATE ITEM

GMAIC Comments on 20 January Launching of Vehicle
From Tyura Tam to Pacific Impact Area

On 20 January at about 1124 EST (1624 GMT) the USSR successfully launched a vehicle from Tyura Tam, about 6500 n. m. to the impact area in the Pacific designated by the USSR on 7 January. The Sibir-class ships participated in a four-hour countdown and were joined by the rangehead in the countdown at "readiness two hours."

A nearly identical countdown on 19 January was terminated after two successive delays which may have deferred launch time to a degree unacceptable to the Soviets.

Based on preliminary analysis [redacted] impact probably occurred in the northern half of the Soviet designated area after a flight of approximately forty minutes. A US airborne observer reported visual sighting of the re-entry in this general area.

[redacted] The Klyuchi facilities located near apogee did not participate in the operation.

There is insufficient data at this time to make an accurate determination of the nature of the vehicle or objectives of the test. This is the first of the Soviet tests which the USSR announced would be initiated in the period 15 January to 15 February 1960. [redacted]

Maps also released

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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The Under Secretary for Political Affairs

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